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Of Non-Horses, Quantum Mechanics, and the 
Establishment Clause 
John M. Bickers∗ 
To use a horse to show that a horse is not a horse is not as good as 
using a non-horse to show that a horse is not a horse.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The pronouncements of Chuang Tzu are seldom easy; his remark 
about non-horses is certainly no exception.  The best explanations 
suggest that he was responding to a group of philosophers who argued 
that attributes are so connected to their objects that to speak of the object 
without the attribute was a form of nonsense.2  True, Chuang Tzu seems 
to tell us, but it is almost equally nonsensical to fail to recognize the 
singularity of objects: for surely if a white horse is not a horse then a 
non-horse is not either. 
As is often the case with the writings of Chuang Tzu, he makes one 
notice several truths in getting where he wishes to go.  He does no more 
than state a logical truth when announcing that a non-horse is not a horse.  
Yet he leaves us with a mystery: what, precisely, is a non-horse?  He 
may have had in mind a shoe, a tea kettle, a tree, or a mountain.  Indeed, 
he may have meant them all and many other things as well.  It is 
impossible to identify any particular object with a term like non-horse.  
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a single criterion by which one of them 
takes pride of place.  It is difficult to imagine a coherent way to 
                                                          
∗  Assistant Professor, Salmon P. Chase College of Law, Northern Kentucky University.  I am 
indebted to Professor Matthew Zacate of the NKU Physics Department for listening patiently to my 
early ideas regarding quantum mechanics and correcting them gently.  My thanks go out to the 
faculty of the Washburn College of Law and my own colleagues at Chase, who heard early versions 
of this paper and offered considerable suggestions for improvement.  My thanks go also to the 
faculty of the Washington University School of Law, who allowed me to present a more mature 
version as part of their on-going series of workshops for junior faculty.  Any remaining errors are, 
sadly, my own. 
 1. THE COMPLETE WORKS OF CHUANG TZU 40 (Burton Watson trans., 1968). 
 2. Most prominently, Kung-sun Lung, whose Discourse on the White Horse makes the claim: 
“A white horse is not a horse . . . . The word ‘horse’ denotes a shape, ‘white’ denotes a color.  What 
denotes color does not denote shape.”  1 FUNG YU-LAN, A HISTORY OF CHINESE PHILOSOPHY, 203–
04 (Derk Bodde trans., Princeton Univ. Press 1983) (1952). 
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determine whether a tool shed is more of a non-horse than a mountain.  If 
size is the criterion, the mountain differs more from a horse than a shed.  
If, on the other hand, the test is natural versus manufactured, it is the tool 
shed that differs the most. 
One thing, at least, is certain: nothing can be both a horse and a non-
horse.  From this tautology arises an interesting corollary: nothing can be 
neither.  All things must either be horses or not.  It is incoherent to speak 
of something that is neither horse nor non-horse.  Nor is it helpful to 
attempt to imagine something that is half way between a horse and a 
non-horse.  Once an object has left the category of horses, logically it 
must be a non-horse.3  A centaur is not neutral between horses and non-
horses.  It is a non-horse just as surely as a tea kettle is. 
Yet for much of the past half-century, the legal community in the 
United States, in its quest to understand the Establishment Clause of the 
First Amendment, has hunted for a mystical animal that is neither horse 
nor non-horse.  Forests of paper and lakes of ink have perished in the 
quest for a test that will isolate those government actions that are neutral 
“between religion and nonreligion.”4 
This Article will argue that the efforts have failed because the quest 
was impossible.  Part II will examine briefly some of the ways that courts 
and commentators have endeavored to achieve neutrality under the 
Establishment Clause.  Using the insights of Chuang Tzu and the 
contradictory results of a pair of recent cases5 dealing with displays of 
the Ten Commandments,6 this part will suggest that, at least in areas of 
                                                          
 3. See Judicial Humour—Construction of a Statute, 8 CRIM. L.Q. 137 (1966) (an amusing 
reading of a law which makes ponies into small birds). 
 4. The phrase first appeared in a Supreme Court opinion in the concurrence by Justice 
Goldberg in School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 305 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring).  
Justice Goldberg cited to no particular authority for the concept.  It first appeared in a majority 
opinion five years later.  Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (stating “The First 
Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion 
and nonreligion”).  Subsequent attempts to find its earliest source have tended to focus on the 1947 
decision in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).  See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU 
of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005).  Intriguingly, the language used in Everson was different, perhaps 
significantly so.  In allowing a New Jersey township to reimburse parents who paid for public 
transportation to take their children to parochial schools, the Court pronounced that the 
establishment clause “requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious 
believers and non-believers.”  Everson, 330 U.S. at 18. 
 5. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005); McCreary County, 545 U.S. 844. 
 6. The Ten Commandments have been a particularly intense area for divisiveness and 
litigation.  This may well represent an erroneous view of American legal history.  See, e.g., Steven 
K. Green, The Fount of Everything Just and Right?  The Ten Commandments as a Source of 
American Law, 14 J.L. & RELIGION 525, 558 (1999–2000) (surveying the historical landscape and 
concluding that “absent a handful of early cases, judicial reliance on the Ten Commandments as a 
source of law was all but nonexistent”). 
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government religious speech, there simply is no logical escape from the 
conundrum of neutrality. 
Part III will seek an escape through a non-logical path: quantum 
mechanics.  As will be seen, quantum mechanics offers more than simply 
a new way to calculate values at the sub-atomic level.  Quantum 
mechanics illustrates a whole series of new phenomena, which are utterly 
inexplicable when viewed through the lens of classical physics.  Indeed, 
some of the philosophical puzzles were so stark that the solution derived 
by a group of scholars working in Denmark—and forever after known as 
the Copenhagen School—was to reject the very nature of reality assumed 
by the classicists.7  The Copenhagen approach required understanding of 
a concept so non-intuitive that it might well have been a teaching of 
Chuang Tzu.  There was no reality, they said, independent of the 
measurement of reality.8 
Part IV will apply this Copenhagen solution to the Establishment 
Clause dilemma discussed in Part II.9  One current Justice, this Article 
will argue, may have hinted at just such a solution.  The Article will then 
examine the results of some of the cases that have come out of the lower 
courts since the two Supreme Court cases of 2005, and determine 
whether the adoption of a Copenhagen solution would solve our Chuang 
Tzu problem.  I will be so bold as to suggest that using this approach 
would do far more to establish religious peace than any of the other 
current options.10 
II. NEUTRALITY AND THE NON-HORSE 
A. The Court’s Quixotic Quest 
It is now customary to refer to Everson v. Board of Education as the 
source of the idea that the Establishment Clause requires neutrality 
between religion and nonreligion.11  Omitted by this casual assertion is 
                                                          
 7. V.K. THANKAPPAN, QUANTUM MECHANICS 448 (2d ed. 1993). 
 8. See infra Part III.B. 
 9. I am unaware of quantum mechanics serving precisely this purpose before; however, it is 
certainly not unknown for providing guidance to legal problems more generally.  See generally 
Laurence H. Tribe, Essay, The Curvature of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can Learn from 
Modern Physics, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1989). 
 10. I do this with a fear that in this area, too, Chuang Tzu offers wise counsel: “[y]our advice is 
like the praying mantis that waved its arms angrily in front of an approaching carriage—it just isn’t 
up to the job.”  Watson, supra note 1, at 133. 
 11. See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 874 (2005) (“The importance 
of neutrality as an interpretive guide is no less true now than it was when the Court broached the 
principle in Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewing.”). 
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the intriguing set of circumstances that faced the Court in that case.  The 
dilemma was over a reimbursement plan for use by students riding public 
buses to school, a plan that included payment to those students who did 
so not to reach public schools, but Catholic schools.12  One can view 
such a plan in two alternate, mutually exclusive ways.  The approach 
adopted by the majority was to see the plan as the provision of a 
government benefit to citizens, religious and nonreligious alike, not 
significantly different from “ordinary police and fire protection, 
connections for sewage disposal, public highways and sidewalks.”13  Of 
course, noted the Court, religious institutions benefit from such services, 
but withdrawal of them only from religious organizations would “require 
the state to be their adversary.”14 
The other possible characterization of the plan appeared in the 
dissent authored by Justice Rutledge.15  From the perspective of the 
taxpayer, public funds were supporting religious education, which Justice 
Rutledge identified with the practice of government-enforced tithing that 
“had been the life blood of establishment before and after other 
compulsions disappeared.”16  Viewed from this perspective, a prohibition 
on extending to students at private religious schools a benefit conveyed 
to those attending public schools would not make the state “unneutral.”17 
Although much of the fight over the meaning of the Establishment 
Clause since Everson has been a historical one,18 there seems nothing 
particularly illogical about the positions of Justices Black and Rutledge.  
It is true that the withdrawal of a benefit only from religious people and 
practices is not “neutral between religion and nonreligion.”19  It is 
equally true that the provision of benefits to religious schools is not 
                                                          
 12. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 3 (1947). 
 13. Id. at 17–18. 
 14. See id. at 18. 
 15. Justice Jackson’s dissent makes similar arguments, but Justice Rutledge most directly 
engages the Court’s characterization of its decision as neutral.  See id. at 28 (Rutledge, J., 
dissenting). 
 16. Id. at 41. 
 17. Id. at 59. 
 18. Unfortunately, the nature of the historical evidence is such that the same facts are 
sometimes used to support both sides of the discussion.  See, e.g., id. at 11–12 (majority opinion) 
(approving of the New Jersey transportation support while citing to Madison’s “great Memorial and 
Remonstrance” against Virginia’s proposed tax to support religion); id. at 37 (Rutledge, J., 
dissenting) (disapproving of the New Jersey transportation support for parochial schools while citing 
to Madison’s “historic Memorial and Remonstrance” against Virginia’s proposed tax to support 
religion). 
 19. Everson is not the only case to embrace this approach.  See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 
U.S. 236, 238 (1968) (permitting state purchase of textbooks for loan to parochial schools); Comm. 
for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980) (permitting state funding of 
testing at parochial schools). 
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neutral.20  The Court in 1947 did not avail itself of the opportunity to 
confront the problem caused by the requirement of neutrality, but the 
opportunity would continue to reappear throughout the next sixty years. 
Rich and full tellings of the tale and the importance of Lemon v. 
Kurtzman21 exist.22  For the purposes of this Article, it is worth 
remembering that Chief Justice Burger sought in that case to construct an 
analytical framework from disparate threads of previous jurisprudence.23  
The Grand Unified Theory24 the Court developed25 encouraged us to 
consider the intent of the government actor, the effect upon the public, 
and the entanglement between the government and the religion.26  At first 
glance, the theory seems both effective and complete.  Conceptually, it 
seems to cover all the areas that might cause concern about religious 
liberty.27 
Yet, as with the Grand Unified Theories of physics, Lemon has 
proven less valuable in practice.  Just as previously attempted Grand 
                                                          
 20. Indeed, the dissenters in cases allowing such benefits typically make this point.  See, e.g., 
Allen, 392 U.S. at 251 (Black, J., dissenting) (“To authorize a State to tax its residents for such 
church purposes is to put the State squarely in the religious activities of certain religious groups that 
happen to be strong enough politically to write their own religious preferences and prejudices into 
the laws.”); Regan, 444 U.S. at 671 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that the Court’s authorization of 
state support for testing programs “confirms my view . . . that the entire enterprise of trying to justify 
various types of subsidies to nonpublic schools should be abandoned”). 
 21. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).  The case considered, and found unconstitutional, salary supplements, 
textbook support, and other financial assistance from Rhode Island and Pennsylvania to religious 
schools.  Id. at 606–07. 
 22. See, e.g., LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 155–59 (2d ed., The Univ. of N.C. Press 1994) (1986). 
 23. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 (“Every analysis in this area must begin with consideration of the 
cumulative criteria developed by the Court over many years.  Three such tests may be gleaned from 
our cases.”). 
 24. In physics, this term is used to describe an explanation that unifies electromagnetism, the 
weak nuclear force, and the strong nuclear force.  STEPHEN W. HAWKING, A BRIEF HISTORY OF 
TIME 74 (1988). 
 25. Of course, Justice O’Connor famously denied that the Lemon test was such a theory.  See 
Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 718 (1994) (“It is always appealing to look for a single test, a 
Grand Unified Theory that would resolve all the cases that may arise under a particular Clause.  
There is, after all, only one Establishment Clause, one Free Speech Clause, one Fourth Amendment, 
one Equal Protection Clause.”).  The Court has nevertheless used Lemon—when it uses it—as just 
such an organizing principle. 
 26. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13 (“First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; 
second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, 
the statute must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’” (citations 
omitted)). 
 27. Indeed, confidence in the Lemon test remains profound in many quarters.  Many federal 
courts continue to rely on Lemon.  See, e.g., Vasquez v. Los Angeles County, 487 F.3d 1246, 1254 
(9th Cir. 2007) (“[Lemon] continues to set forth the applicable constitutional standard for assessing 
the validity of governmental actions challenged under the Establishment Clause.”). 
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Unified Theories had to ignore phenomena they could not explain,28 the 
Supreme Court has similarly found cases in which Lemon was less than 
useful.  In such cases, the Court occasionally simply refuses to 
acknowledge it.29  Of course, there are Justices who openly loathe Lemon 
and consistently call for its explicit rejection.30  Perhaps more puzzling to 
the observer are those Justices who remain content to use Lemon as the 
appropriate test in some cases but utterly ignore it in others.31  Perhaps 
this inconsistent application best explains the appearance in the last 
quarter-century of other analytical models to replace, augment, or 
explain Lemon.  It is not insignificant, though, that many of the models 
proceed from the same starting point as Lemon itself: the desire for a 
decision-making methodology that will ensure that the government 
action is neutral between religion and nonreligion. 
These other tests have taken a variety of forms.  Some Justices 
proposed that the relevant test was one of coercion,32 and the idea that 
the government cannot force any one to worship or support churches has 
a great deal of intuitive appeal.33  Despite strong uses in important cases, 
                                                          
 28. Most importantly, gravity.  See HAWKING, supra note 24, at 74 (“[T]he resultant theories 
are not all that grand, nor are they fully unified, as they do not include gravity.”). 
 29. Famously, the Court allowed Nebraska’s practice of opening legislative sessions with a 
prayer by a paid chaplain.  Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 794–95 (1983).  The Court’s only 
mention of Lemon in doing so was the almost casual observation that the Eighth Circuit opinion had 
used the Lemon test and found that the practice violated all three parts of the test.  Id. at 786.  
Although the Court reversed the court below, the opinion makes no further mention of the Lemon 
test. 
 30. Perhaps never more memorably than by one of its most implacable opponents: “Like some 
ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being 
repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence once again, 
frightening the little children and school attorneys of Center Moriches Union Free School District.”  
Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993) (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
 31. None more prominently than Chief Justice Burger, who authored both the Lemon test and 
the opinion for the Court in Marsh v. Chambers, which ignored it.  See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 786. 
 32. The idea of coercion as the key prohibition of the Establishment Clause may have arisen in 
the school prayer and Bible-reading cases, see, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), Sch. Dist. 
v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), but it reached its clearest articulation in a series of dissents and 
concurrences to opinions that overtly used the Lemon test.  See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 
U.S. 226, 260 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and in the judgment) (“[T]he government 
cannot coerce any student to participate in a religious activity.”); County of Allegheny v. ACLU 
Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 659 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) (“[G]overnment may not coerce anyone to support or participate in any religion or its 
exercise.”). 
 33. There had been a tradition in many colonies, of course, of established churches which 
received mandatory church support.  See, e.g., LEVY, supra note 22, 2–26.  On the other hand, four 
colonies—Delaware, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island—had never established a church 
at all.  Id. at 27–28.  Even in the colonies with taxpayer-funded established churches, there had long 
been an undercurrent that coerced religion was worthless to God as well as an offense against 
liberty.  Perhaps the most famous exposition of this belief was in James Madison’s Memorial and 
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a disagreement between the proponents of the test may have prevented it 
from developing any permanent hold over the Establishment Clause.34 
The next test to enter the arena had perhaps the strangest history of 
all.  So linked with a particular Justice that it is frequently labeled 
“Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test,”35 this test focused on whether the 
government action made one’s religion relevant to political standing 
within the community. 36  This “clarification of our Establishment Clause 
doctrine”37 would prohibit government speech conveying to minorities 
that they were disfavored members of the community, and convey to 
members of the majority faith that they were specially favored and 
valued by the government.38  The test required, though, that courts 
evaluate the government speech at issue in context.39 
Unlike the coercion test, which may not seek neutrality, the 
endorsement test found its very reason for being in the pursuit of that 
goal.  Justice O’Connor noted that government practices could not  
 
                                                                                                                       
Remonstrance against Religious Assessments, which opposed a tax to be used to support churches 
within the Commonwealth of Virginia.  Madison argued that “what is here a right towards men, is a 
duty towards the Creator.  It is the duty of every man to render to the Creator such homage and such 
only as he believes to be acceptable to him.”  8 JAMES MADISON, A Memorial and Remonstrance, in 
THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 298, 299 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1973). 
 34. Arguably, the triumphant moment for the test came in a government speech case that also 
marked a split between two of its chief advocates.  See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).  In 
considering the appearance of a Rabbi to give a nondenominational blessing at a middle school 
graduation, Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court that social pressure could be coercive.  Id. at 581.  
Justice Scalia, in a bitter dissent, insisted that only the criminal or taxing power of the state was 
coercive.  Id. at 632 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Intriguingly, neither of these warring opinions expressly 
sought neutrality.  In his concurrence, however, Justice Souter did.  Although he noted that neutrality 
was not “self-revealing,” id. at 627 (Souter, J., concurring), it is noteworthy that for Justice Souter 
neutrality was still the goal to be sought, and the application of the coercion test not inconsistent 
with it.  Id. at 609. 
 35. An October 12, 2008 Westlaw search of the Journals and Law Reviews database for the 
phrase “Justice O’Connor’s endorsement” (including those who refer to it as “analysis” as well as 
“test”) returned 405 distinct articles. 
 36. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (At issue was 
a display, in a park in Pawtucket, of Christmas cutout figures that included both secular items and 
some which depicted the birth of Jesus.). 
 37. Id. at 687. 
 38. Id. at 688. 
 39. Id. at 679.  Many commentators concluded that the Court had created a “plastic reindeer 
rule,” see, e.g., George M. Janocsko, Beyond the “Plastic Reindeer Rule”: The Curious Case of 
County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 28 DUQ. L. REV. 445 (1990), a “three 
reindeer rule,” see, e.g., Bradley S. Tupi, Religious Freedom and the First Amendment, 45 DUQ. L. 
REV. 195, 236 (2007), or even a “three-plastic animals rule,” see, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, 
Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 127 (1992).  I confess that I have 
always been more fascinated by Pawtucket’s inclusion of a clown, a dancing elephant, and a robot as 
symbols of Christmas.  See Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. 1150, 1155 (D.R.I. 1981) (listing 
contents of the Christmas display), rev’d 465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
08.0_BICKERS FINAL 12/5/2008  12:50:20 PM 
378 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57 
endorse the faiths of some citizens “[i]f government is to be neutral in 
matters of religion.”40 
B. Other Views of Neutrality 
Neutrality appealed to the Everson Court, and appeals to many 
today, because it seems inherently just.  When our pluralistic society 
contains fierce and unrelenting partisans on opposite sides of an issue, 
the role of the judiciary as a neutral arbiter or umpire41 between them 
seems appropriate.  Of course, genuine attempts to remain neutral may 
seem unfair to losing participants.42  Putting aside conspiratorial theories 
of both sides, however, observers are left with the unmistakable fact that 
Establishment Clause cases, especially at the Supreme Court, seem to 
have listed to one side or another despite protestations (often by both the 
majority and dissent in the same case) that they were seeking the neutral 
solution.  The logical challenge faced by the Everson Court has not 
receded, and the various attempts to resolve it only highlight the 
difficulty of the quest. 
It was inevitable that scholars would enter the fray in endeavoring to 
explain the role of neutrality as alternate tests contended for advocates 
among the members of the Supreme Court.  After all, Everson may have 
given birth to the ideal of Establishment Clause neutrality, but it was a 
law professor who best articulated it as a thing worth seeking.  Professor 
Kurland’s epic, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court,43 remains 
vital today, but his optimism about the nature of the disagreements in the 
Supreme Court44 does not still seem justifiable.45 
More recently, some scholars have argued that neutrality was not a 
guide to the Court during much of the formative period of Establishment 
                                                          
 40. County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 627 (1989). 
 41. “Judges are like umpires.  Umpires don’t make the rules, they apply them.”  Confirmation 
Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. To Be Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr.). 
 42. Indeed, in the related area of private speech on public land, one scholar has observed that a 
policy of neutrality is unfair, as it inherently favors majority religions.  See Alberto B. Lopez, Equal 
Access and the Public Forum: Pinette’s Imbalance of Free Speech and Establishment, 55 BAYLOR 
L. REV. 167, 222 (2003). 
 43. See Philip B. Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 
(1961) (arguing that together the religion clauses prohibited the government from using religion as 
the basis for government action, regardless of whether the action would benefit or burden religion). 
 44. “There is little quarrel, today, about the goals to be achieved by the religion clauses of the 
first amendment.  The problem that has bemused and confused the Court has been that of stating 
appropriate principles to serve as means to agreed-upon ends.”  Id. at 96. 
 45. See infra Part IV.B. 
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Clause doctrine.  For some, the dominant doctrine during the 1970s and 
1980s was separationism.46  Professor Ira Lupu argued that this focus on 
separating church and state, which “required reduction in public 
celebration of sectarian religion,”47 had “a doctrine of secular privilege at 
its heart.”48  As will be discussed below, Professor Lupu’s observation 
recognized that, at least as to government speech, there could be no 
neutrality between the horse and the non-horse. 
Professor Douglas Laycock rejected the idea that separationism was 
opposed to neutrality.  Indeed, he has argued that there is a fundamental 
goal behind both ideas: the minimization of government influence over 
the religious choices of individuals—a goal he labels “substantive 
neutrality.”49  He identifies two different theories of neutrality as 
competing for dominance within Supreme Court cases that deal with the 
concept: “no-aid” and “nondiscrimination.”50  The former, which he 
finds originating in the debate over public financing of churches in the 
eighteenth century,51 requires that the government provide no benefit to 
religion.  He finds this to be the predominant strand in the logic of 
Lemon, particularly its second prong.52  The neutrality that the 
Establishment Clause requires, in this theory, is inactivity: “doing 
nothing neither helps nor hurts religion.”53 
The neutrality of the nondiscrimination principle, which Laycock 
finds demonstrated in—but not created by54—Widmar v. Vincent,55 
prevents the government from placing a burden on religion different 
from that placed on nonreligion.56  The focus on “analogous secular 
                                                          
 46. See, e.g., Carl H. Esbeck, A Constitutional Case for Governmental Cooperation with Faith-
Based Social Service Providers, 46 EMORY L.J. 1, 4 (1997) (Professor Esbeck refers to neutrality as 
separationism’s “major competitor.”). 
 47. Ira C. Lupu, The Lingering Death of Separationism, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 230, 231 
(1993). 
 48. Id. at 249. 
 49. Douglas Laycock, The Underlying Unity of Separation and Neutrality, 46 EMORY L.J. 43, 
69–70 (1997). 
 50. Id. at 48. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 56. 
 53. Id. at 48. 
 54. See id. at 62–63.  Laycock finds the idea to be much older, hearkening back not only to 
Everson but also to cases as diverse as West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 
641–42 (1943) (Jehovah’s Witnesses not required to participate in public school daily flag salute), 
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310–11 (1940) (breach of peace statute could not be used 
against religiously offensive speech that did not meet the “clear and present danger” standard), and 
even Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291, 291 (1899) (government not barred from contracting with 
hospital because of its religious identity). 
 55. 454 U.S. 263 (1981). 
 56. Laycock, supra note 49, at 48. 
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activities”57 means that the government may neither help nor harm 
religions.58  In practice, because the no-aid theory should prevent 
government from helping religions, the nondiscrimination theory may 
carry the most weight in cases where government is denying a benefit to 
religions.59 
Professor Laycock’s theory of substantive neutrality endeavors to 
chart a course between these theories by tacking from one to the other 
rather than by purporting to sail evenly between them.  By focusing on 
the goal of minimizing government influence upon religion, one can 
determine whether “substantive neutrality” means, in a particular 
instance, no-aid or nondiscrimination.60  For examples of the former—
government-inactivity focus—he offers the kind of regulatory 
exemptions usually associated with the Free Exercise Clause.61  The 
latter—nondiscriminatory theory—is useful in cases where the 
government is exercising secular authority in a way that requires it to 
have contact with religious institutions, like “paying for soup kitchens.”62  
In those instances, government withholding of benefits to religious 
institutions can be characterized as giving incentives to secularize, a far 
cry from a minimal role in religion for the state.63 
Professor Laycock’s theory, helpful in many areas, becomes 
somewhat inflexible when dealing with religious speech by the 
government.  He concludes that because celebration or praise by 
government makes religion better off than it would otherwise be, such 
government action should be judged against a baseline of government 
inaction.64  As any government speech is less neutral than no government 
speech, the government should not speak at all.65  Left unanswered are 





                                                          
 57. Id. 
 58. See id. 
 59. See id. 
 60. Laycock, supra note 49, at 70. 
 61. Id. at 71–72. 
 62. Id. at 71. 
 63. See id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See id. at 72 (“[T]he same rule applies in either case: government should neither praise nor 
condemn religion in general or any religion in particular.”). 
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evidence of that speech remains today.66  In such cases, may—or must—
the government act to remove vestiges of its former speech? 
A number of scholars have even argued that neutrality does not 
exist.67  Professor Steven D. Smith, for example, has endeavored to show 
that no amount of tinkering with constitutional doctrines of religion 
could ever prove satisfactory.68  He argues powerfully that because there 
is no single theory of religious freedom, current analyses of the 
Establishment Clause were “doomed from the start.”69  He characterizes 
neutrality as “illusory” because of the lack of a truly neutral vantage 
point from which to judge from among these alternate versions of 
freedom.70 
Although Professor Smith’s ideas are powerful and compelling, this 
Article stops well short of them.  The idea that a view of constitutional 
text is utterly dependent upon the belief system of the observer is not, 
ultimately, cabinable.71  His argument ultimately leads, it seems to me, to 
an expansive critique, the refutation of which is well beyond my intent—
and certainly my abilities.  A simple thought experiment may illustrate 
my point.  Consider the existence of a true solipsist, convinced that his 
consciousness alone exists.  How is one to convince that person of the 
importance of law without any reference to a belief system that he, by 
definition, does not share?72 
                                                          
 66. There is a further difficulty in this area that arises from the juxtaposition of the First 
Amendment’s two guarantees regarding religion.  For some scholars the Establishment Clause and 
the Free Exercise Clause work together to create “religious liberty,” and maintain that the same test 
should be used for both.  See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 49, at 45–46; Esbeck, supra note 46, 27–28; 
Lupu, supra note 47, at 256–79.  The Supreme Court has not historically shared this approach, and 
this Article will proceed with the assumption that Free Exercise doctrine has little light to offer on 
the permissibility of government religious displays. 
 67. Others acknowledge that it does exist, but is “ambiguous, sometimes irresolvably so.”  John 
T. Valauri, The Concept of Neutrality in Establishment Clause Doctrine, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 83, 92 
(1986).  Although not rejecting the concept as Professor Smith does, Professor Valauri suggested 
that the indeterminacy of neutrality “reflects an underlying disagreement about the basic standards of 
evaluation.”  Id. at 93. 
 68. See STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL 
PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM  5 (1995) (“[N]o amount of rethinking, however meticulous or 
energetic, is likely to improve the situation as long as we insist on pressing the same bad 
questions.”).  For a thoughtful example that continues this line of argument, see Frank S. Ravitch, A 
Funny Thing Happened on the Way to Neutrality: Broad Principles, Formalism, and the 
Establishment Clause, 38 GA. L. REV. 489 (2004). 
 69. SMITH, supra note 68, at 16. 
 70. Id. at 97. 
 71. Indeed, Professor Smith reports being told by early reviewers of his work that “the 
claims . . . extended well beyond the First Amendment’s religion clauses.”  Id. at v. 
 72. This is not as far a rhetorical stretch as might be assumed.  To argue that everything 
depends on perspective, Professor Smith quotes Oliver Cromwell as supporting “freedom of 
conscience” while prohibiting the celebration of the mass.  Id. at 8.  By raising Cromwell to an 
example of one view, among many, of religious liberty, he demonstrates the breadth of his 
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The notion that nothing can occupy a midpoint between a horse and 
all things that are not horses is a good deal smaller than the argument that 
all positions rely on underlying, and hence untestable, predispositions of 
truth.73 
C. Impossibility and Logic 
If the initial hypothesis of this Article is correct—that neutrality is 
problematic—then it is especially problematic in religious speech cases.  
The difficulty is not that the boundaries have been poorly drawn, nor 
even that the available tests have failed to show the proper location of the 
boundaries.  The problem is insoluble: a particular government action 
must be either religious or irreligious.  If nothing can be neutral between 
a horse and a non-horse, then surely nothing can be neutral between 
religion and nonreligion.  Indeed, this view may well inform some of 
those who seek “neutrality,” but a neutrality that persistently tilts to the 
nonreligious side of the balance. 
Of course, such forces are not likely to go unmet in a robust 
discussion in a democratic society, and indeed, they do not.  Some 
scholars (and even judicial figures74) have responded that neutrality, as 
articulated in Lemon, reflects an attitude that dismisses religion—religion 
that merits a place, perhaps even a privileged place, in the American 
system.75  Such scholars frequently echo the observations of the most 
celebrated observer of the young United States, who argued in 1840 that 
“belief is more necessary” to people living in a democracy “than to all 
others.”76 
                                                                                                                       
enterprise. 
 73. Unlike the Professor Smith attack, this concern about neutrality does leave room for 
solutions.  This, after all, was the challenge-and-response posed a quarter-century ago by Judge Bork 
in his argument that “[t]here is no principled way to decide that one man’s gratifications are more 
deserving of respect than another’s.”  Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First 
Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 10 (1971).  Judge Bork’s solution to this litigation difficulty 
was to limit rights to those “the framers actually . . . intended and which are capable of being 
translated into principled rules” as well as those “located in the individual for the sake of a 
governmental process that the Constitution outlines.”  Id. at 17. 
 74. This viewpoint is held by at least one Justice.  See Thomas B. Colby, A Constitutional 
Hierarchy of Religions? Justice Scalia, the Ten Commandments, and the Future of the Establishment 
Clause, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1105, 1139 (2006) (arguing that Justice Scalia’s dissent in 
McCreary County is “an all-out assault on the venerable principle of neutrality,” and that his 
understanding “aligns almost perfectly with the political preferences of the Republican Party”). 
 75. Patrick M. Garry, Religious Freedom Deserves More than Neutrality: The Constitutional 
Argument for Nonpreferential Favoritism of Religion, 57 FLA. L. REV. 1, 33 (2005) (“Neutrality 
ignores the special value of religion . . . .”). 
 76. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, 154 (Henry Reeve trans., rev. ed., 
vol. II, Colonial Press 1899).  De Tocqueville felt that the greatest danger to a democracy was 
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Indeed, there have been moments that caused the Supreme Court to 
fear that a doctrine of neutrality in reality drew them into the position of 
choosing between two opposing sides with no real neutral ground 
between them.  Justice Hugo Black, often thought of as the developer of 
the neutrality doctrine,77 expressed some concern on this very point two 
decades later.78  In the context of a state statute prohibiting the teaching 
of evolution, the Court focused on the fact that the legislature had 
“select[ed] from the body of knowledge a particular segment which it 
proscrib[ed] for the sole reason that it is deemed to conflict with . . . a 
particular interpretation of the Book of Genesis by a particular religious 
group.”79  That much was certainly true.80  Of course, the reverse was 
true as well, which troubled Justice Black.  If, in fact, Darwinian 
evolution was “anti-religious,” how could its teaching be neutral?81  
Indeed, critics of neutrality theory can point to the dilemma that bothered 
Justice Black to show this seemingly self-contradictory feature of the 
pursuit of neutrality.82 
The Epperson dilemma arises from the fundamental difficulty of 
neutrality as a guiding principle for courts in cases requesting 
injunctions: there can be no neutral position between the litigants.  At the 
end of the case, the court must decide.  It may grant the injunction, or it 
may deny it.  It can allow the state to prohibit the teaching of evolution, 
or it can forbid the state from doing so.  It cannot do both, and there is no 
neutral position between the horses and non-horses of allowing and 
forbidding.83 
                                                                                                                       
unchecked materialism, as “[d]emocracy encourages a taste for physical gratification.”  Id.  
Therefore it did not matter to the Frenchman what the particular religious beliefs were: “[T]he 
community would run less risk of being brutalized by believing that the soul of man will pass into 
the carcass of a hog, than by believing that the soul of man is nothing at all.”  Id. at 155. 
 77. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (Justice Black stated, “[The First] 
Amendment requires the state to be a [sic] neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers 
and non-believers . . . .”); see also discussion supra Part II.A. 
 78. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 109 (Black, J., concurring). 
 79. Id. at 103 (majority opinion). 
 80. Arkansas adopted the statute at issue in response to the Scopes Monkey Trial.  Id. at 98. 
 81. Id. at 113 (Black, J., concurring).  Black accepted the notion that the teaching of evolution 
was anti-religious, and therefore proposed that the removal of both evolution and creationism from 
the classrooms would “leave the State in a neutral position.”  Id.  This approach was rejected by the 
Supreme Court in Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 593–94, 596 (1987). 
 82. See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 68, at 83.  Professor Smith constructs a pair of syllogisms from 
the case showing that the Constitution both compels and prohibits the teaching of evolution in public 
schools. 
 83. If there was any requirement for further chaos, it could be supplied by Kaufman v. 
McCaughtry, 419 F.3d 678 (7th Cir. 2004), which found a violation of the Establishment Clause 
when a prison disallowed the formation of an atheist study group.  Agreeing that the government 
may accommodate religion while not accommodating nonreligion, the court nonetheless barred the 
government action because “atheism is Kaufman’s religion.”  Id. at 684.  When atheism is itself, in 
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D. The Ten Commandments Cases 
A pair of cases argued together in March 2005, gave rise to a hope 
that the Supreme Court intended to sort out Establishment Clause chaos 
in the area of symbolic government speech.  The Court granted certiorari 
on two challenges to government display of the Ten Commandments in 
disparate settings.  In Austin, Texas, the twenty-two acre lawn 
surrounding the state capitol building was dotted with almost forty 
markers and monuments.84  Among them stood a Ten Commandments 
monument that the Fraternal Order of Eagles (FOE) had funded in 
1961.85  Nearly forty years later and a thousand miles away, officials in 
Kentucky’s Pulaski and McCreary counties hung framed copies of the 
Ten Commandments on the inside walls of their courthouses.86  I suspect 
that I was not alone in thinking that the pairing of these two cases was a 
boon for legal clarity.  The Court seemed likely to divide the two cases, 
allowing only one of them to stand, and offer a consistent rationale that 
would demonstrate the difference between the two.87 
Sadly, this was not to be.  Rather than adopting consistent principles, 
the lead opinions in the two cases took contradictory views of both test 
and result.  The Court in McCreary County used the traditional Lemon 
analysis to find that the display was improper.88  The Court said the 
display had “a predominantly religious purpose.”89  The Court addressed 
the purpose of the current arrangement of documents—a potpourri called 
“The Foundations of American Law and Government Display”90—within 
the context of the two displays which had come before it.91  The first 
consisted only of the Ten Commandments.92  By contrast, because the 
                                                                                                                       
religious terms, a horse, one can only wonder if anything can even qualify as a non-horse. 
 84. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 681 (2005). 
 85. Id. at 681–82. 
 86. McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 851 (2005). 
 87. Indeed, two years earlier the Court had done precisely this with equal protection challenges 
to affirmative action in a pair of cases involving the University of Michigan Law School and the 
College of Literature, Science, and the Arts of the same university.  Compare Grutter v. Bollinger, 
539 U.S. 306 (2003), with Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
 88. 545 U.S. at 859–63. 
 89. Id. at 881. 
 90. Id. at 856.  The display consisted of not only the Ten Commandments, but also “framed 
copies of the Magna Carta, the Declaration of Independence, the Bill of Rights, the lyrics of the Star 
Spangled Banner, the Mayflower Compact, the National Motto, the Preamble to the Kentucky 
Constitution, and a picture of Lady Justice.”  Id.  The state constitution preamble would seem to be 
included because it, like everything else on the list except the Bill of Rights and the picture, contains 
an overtly religious reference.  See KY. CONST. pmbl. (“We, the people of the Commonwealth of 
Kentucky, grateful to Almighty God for the civil, political and religious liberties we enjoy . . . .”). 
 91. McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 868–69. 
 92. Id. at 851. 
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second consisted of the Ten Commandments surrounded by other overtly 
religious documents,93 the Court had no difficulty in determining that the 
county’s purpose was not educational or historical, but religious.94  The 
author of the opinion, Justice Souter, referred to the companion case 
from Texas only once—and that was to repeat a pro-separation comment 
from James Madison that Justice Stevens quoted in his dissent in Van 
Orden.95  The Court’s opinion in McCreary County brought forth a fierce 
dissent by Justice Scalia, who cited to the plurality opinion in Van Orden 
a handful of times96 and once to the concurrence by Justice Breyer.97  
The great preponderance of Scalia’s discussion of the Texas case, 
though, was to the dissent by Justice Stevens, which he claimed was 
“largely devoted to an attack upon a straw man.”98 
Justice Scalia’s view of neutrality, given voice in the dissent, was 
that neutrality among sects was required in public funding cases, but that 
favoring religion over irreligion was constitutional.99  Indeed, pointing to 
the string of cases where the Court allowed practices that benefited 
religion, Justice Scalia suggested that history was an inappropriate 
support for any practice that would otherwise violate the Constitution.100  
Instead, he suggested that the Court in those cases backed away from 
neutrality out of fear of backlash. 101  In short, there is no hint from any  
 
                                                          
 93. Id. at 853–54.  The second display included the following: 
[T]he ‘endowed by their Creator’ passage from the Declaration of Independence; the 
Preamble to the Constitution of Kentucky; the national motto, ‘In God We Trust’; a page 
from the Congressional Record of February 2, 1983, proclaiming the Year of the Bible 
and including a statement of the Ten Commandments; a proclamation by President 
Abraham Lincoln designating April 30, 1863, a National Day of Prayer and Humiliation; 
an excerpt from President Lincoln’s ‘Reply to Loyal Colored People of Baltimore upon 
Presentation of a Bible,’ reading that ‘[t]he Bible is the best gift God has ever given to 
man’; a proclamation by President Reagan marking 1983 the Year of the Bible; and the 
Mayflower Compact. 
Id. at 854 (citations omitted). 
 94. Id. at 881. 
 95. Id. at 878–79. 
 96. See, e.g., id. at 905 n.10 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (referring to the “undeniable historical 
meaning” of the Ten Commandments as “a symbol of the religious foundations of law”). 
 97. Id. at 908. 
 98. Id. at 895. 
 99. Id. at 892–93. 
 100. Id. at 892. 
 101. Id. at 892–93 (“What, then, could be the genuine ‘good reason’ for occasionally ignoring 
the neutrality principle?  I suggest it is the instinct for self-preservation, and the recognition that the 
Court, which ‘has no influence over either the sword or the purse’ cannot go too far down the road of 
an enforced neutrality that contradicts both historical fact and current practice without losing all that 
sustains it: the willingness of the people to accept its interpretation of the Constitution as 
definitive . . . .” (citations omitted)). 
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opinion in McCreary County that a predictable doctrine governed both 
cases. 
This jurisprudential isolationism continued in the companion case.  
The plurality opinion in Van Orden made no mention whatsoever of the 
seemingly inconsistent result in the Kentucky case, a fact noted by 
Justice Thomas in his concurrence.102  The plurality found that the Lemon 
test was “not useful”103 in this context.  Instead, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s opinion asserted that “[s]imply having religious content or 
promoting a message consistent with a religious doctrine does not run 
afoul of the Establishment Clause.”104  This, in turn, spawned the above-
mentioned dissent by Justice Stevens, but did not give rise to the kind of 
cross-reference that would allow readers to find a dispositive 
understanding of the combined meaning of these cases. 
Like the Michigan affirmative action cases of two years earlier, the 
Ten Commandments cases of 2005 were a pair of 5-4 decisions in which 
only one Justice was in the majority on both cases.  Unlike Gratz and 
Grutter, however, that Justice did not author one of the principle 
opinions, thus severely limiting the consistency of the results.105  Indeed, 
Justice Breyer, in providing the critical fifth vote in Van Orden, 
concurred only in the result.  Far from the Michigan solution of 
articulating a test and finding that one set of facts passed and the other 
failed, the Ten Commandments cases of 2005 left us with two conflicting 
sets of outlooks upon closely related circumstances.  They are very 
useful in arguing for a desired result, but less so if one seeks guidance to 
the Supreme Court’s view of the correct answer in a particular case. 
For example, one can look to the majority in McCreary County and 
discover principles by which to evaluate government speech.  One could 
use Lemon’s purpose prong to guarantee neutrality.106  If the purpose was 
not neutral—if the government sought to favor religion—a court could 
find the government action unconstitutional.  This look at purpose is not 
                                                          
 102. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 697 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The 
inconsistency between the decisions that the Court reaches today . . . only compounds the 
confusion.”). 
 103. Id. at 686 (plurality opinion). 
 104. Id. at 690. 
 105. It may well be that the presence of Justice O’Connor in both majorities was responsible for 
the acknowledgement of Grutter in Gratz: “Petitioners further argue that ‘diversity as a basis for 
employing racial preferences is simply too open-ended, ill-defined, and indefinite to constitute a 
compelling interest capable of supporting narrowly-tailored means.’  But for the reasons set forth 
today in Grutter v. Bollinger (citation omitted), the Court has rejected these arguments of 
petitioners.”  Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 268 (2003). 
 106. McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 860. 
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threatening because it is what courts frequently do.107  However, the 
court need not worry about whether the government officials have 
sinister motives in their hearts when they act, because the key to 
understanding the purpose prong is Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test, 
which is concerned with public expression of governmental intent.108 
If one is displeased with this relatively restrictive approach to 
government religious speech, one could turn instead to the plurality in 
Van Orden.  There we learn that the Lemon test is “not useful in dealing 
with the sort of passive monument that Texas has erected on its Capitol 
grounds.”109  Indeed, the Ten Commandments are undeniably 
religious,110 but the Supreme Court’s “opinions, like our building, have 
recognized the role the Decalogue plays in America’s heritage.”111  
Because the Ten Commandments have a “dual significance,”112 
representing both religion and government, the opinion of Chief Justice 
Rehnquist would always allow them.  There is simply nothing in his 
opinion that allows the reader to reconcile it with the simultaneous 
majority opinion of Justice Stevens in McCreary County. 
One is inclined to throw up hands in an expression of disbelief: to 
recognize these opinions as equally valid is to find a horse that is also a 
non-horse.  This will not do.  However, there may be a way out.  
Professionals in other fields have faced the problem of reconciling 
seemingly opposite and simultaneous ideas.  In the last century, it was 
the physicists, not the lawyers, who had to confront this quandary, as 
they faced the fact that subatomic particles were also, contradictorily, 
waves. 
III. A BRIEF DETOUR INTO THE ODD WORLD OF QUANTUM 
MECHANICS113 
A paradigm shift of extraordinary size occurred in the world of 
physics over the last one hundred years.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, it has 
                                                          
 107. See id. at 861 (“[It] is a staple of statutory interpretation that makes up the daily fare of 
every appellate court in the country.”). 
 108. See id. at 863 (“A secret motive stirs up no strife and does nothing to make outsiders of 
nonadherents . . . .”). 
 109. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 686 (plurality opinion). 
 110. Id. at 690. 
 111. Id. at 689. 
 112. Id. at 692. 
 113. I am not a physicist.  My (limited) understanding in this section is gleaned solely from texts 
designed for laymen, and discussion with some very patient physicists.  Despite their generally high 
quality, I may be horribly wrong.  I apologize to anyone who understands this area better than I and 
grimaces at my overgeneralizations. 
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made little impact in the worldview of most non-physicists,114 despite the 
extraordinary changes it has wrought in all of our lives.  The discovery of 
quantum mechanics, its formulation in a series of mathematical models 
that have proved constant and accurate, and the inability of the 
community of scientists to agree on just what underlying reality was 
signified by the equations, forms a story that is both compelling and too 
complex to be told here.  Two particularly famous experiments, though, 
shed some light on the fundamental conundrum of what might be called 
the philosophical difficulty of quantum mechanics.  It is this difficulty, in 
turn, that may help us reach a new understanding of the Establishment 
Clause. 
A. What Matters is Measurement 
1. The Stern-Gerlach Device 
One of these experiments concerns the Stern-Gerlach device, which 
involves the use of magnets to affect the trajectories of particles.  A 
Stern-Gerlach device is a pair of magnets, one with north polarity and the 
other south, facing each other.  The device operates because of the 
internal magnetic property, or “spin” of objects.  This pair of magnets 
affects the paths of things fired between them, causing them to bend 
toward one magnet and away from the other in degrees dependent upon 
their direction and velocity of spin.115 
In 1921, when Professors Stern and Gerlach tried out their apparatus 
on silver atoms, they discovered a wholly unexpected result.  The device 
deflected the atoms into two—and only two—paths.  The beam fired 
through the Stern-Gerlach device would split into two beams: one beam 
deflecting toward the north polarity magnet, the other beam deflecting 
toward the south polarity magnet.  The result was incontrovertible and 
consistent in repeated tests.116  Physicists used the device for further trials 
with electrons, the negatively charged sub-atomic particles.  Any oddities 
in the silver trials caused by the internal structure of the atom were thus 
eliminated.117  Electrons behaved in precisely the same way as the silver 
                                                          
 114. After all, discoveries made centuries ago have not completely restructured the way that we 
talk—and perhaps think—about reality.  I still refer to the sun rising, even though I know better.  I 
do not believe that I am alone in doing so. 
 115. DAVID LINDLEY, WHERE DOES THE WEIRDNESS GO?  WHY QUANTUM MECHANICS IS 
STRANGE, BUT NOT AS STRANGE AS YOU THINK 9 (1996). 
 116. Max Jammer, The Conceptual Development of Quantum Mechanics, in 12 THE HISTORY OF 
MODERN PHYSICS 1800–1950, at 131 (2d ed. 1989). 
 117. DAVID WICK, THE INFAMOUS BOUNDARY: SEVEN DECADES OF CONTROVERSY IN 
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atoms.  They apparently did not have wildly different axes and rates of 
spin; they were not like little baseballs thrown in the air—some curves, 
some fastballs, and the occasional knuckleball.  Whatever they had that 
passed for spin occurred in only two forms (labeled, for convenience if 
not accuracy, “up” and “down”).  No matter how many times the electron 
beam traveled through the Stern-Gerlach device, the result was the same: 
the up electrons went to one area and the down electrons to another.118  
The result was difficult to explain, but at least it was simple. 
Or so it seemed at first.  The series of Stern-Gerlach experiments 
gave constant results when the device was rotated ninety degrees.  The 
beam of electrons would still split into two equal beams when leaving the 
device, whether it was perpendicular to the earth’s surface or parallel: the 
two beams would themselves always be parallel to the magnets in the 
apparatus, so the twin beams could be made to rotate a full circle by 
rotating the Stern-Gerlach device on its axis.  This demonstrated that the 
magnets, and not any intrinsic property of the initial beam, caused the 
result.119 
Things became more complex, though, as other Stern-Gerlach 
devices were added in series.  When a second device was placed along 
the line of one of the two beams exiting the first apparatus, no electron 
changed its behavior.  Fifty percent of the electron stream exited the first 
apparatus by going up and all came through the second apparatus still 
going up.  This was unsurprising.  There was no reason why any 
particular electron having an up spin should change.  The same 
conventional result occurred with the down spin electrons.120 
Matters grew more curious when the second device was set 
perpendicular to the first along one of the beams.  Fifty percent of the 
electrons went in, all happily demonstrating their up spin.  In this second 
device they would be sorted again, but could only emerge, if the pattern 
held, left and right.  That is what they did, and in equal numbers.  
Whatever the “spin” of electrons might represent, they would travel 
between the magnets and split into two beams in equal numbers, 
regardless of having demonstrated a different spin only an instant 
before.121 
The problem approached the level of a Zen koan when the scientists 
placed a third Stern-Gerlach device onto one of the left or right beams, 
                                                                                                                       
QUANTUM PHYSICS 13 (1995). 
 118. LINDLEY, supra note 115, at 17. 
 119. Id. at 18. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 18–20. 
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parallel to the original apparatus.  Now the entirety of the second beam 
emerged again, this time split into equal parts of up and down electrons. 
This, if contemplated conventionally, makes no sense.  Half of the 
electrons, the down spinners, were weeded out by the first machine.  The 
second showed that all of those that remained were capable of showing a 
left or right bias.  The third now showed that either the left or right 
spinners were capable of splitting, fifty-fifty, into up and down spinners.  
To confirm the puzzling result, Stern and Gerlach removed the second 
device.  The electrons complied with their prior (bewildering) behavior: 
all of the up spin electrons went up again as they exited the second 
machine.  An up-down spin, once measured, remained constant.  
Reinstallation of the middle device renewed the paradox: a left-right 
spin, once measured, restored the uncertainty of the up-down spin even 
in those electrons that had been confirmed up-spinners an instant 
before.122 
Difficult arguments among unsatisfactory options occurred over 
what these results meant.  Before examining them, and considering their 
impact on legal thinking, it is worth looking at the other paradigmatic 
problem presented by quantum mechanics. 
2. Light and the Two Slits 
Professor Richard Feynman was fond of saying that the most critical 
thing to understanding quantum mechanics was the experiment with the 
two holes, because it was “impossible, absolutely impossible, to explain 
in any classical way . . . .”123  At first glance, it seems to reflect a very 
different problem from the Stern-Gerlach apparatus.  Upon further 
consideration, they suggest the same conclusion. 
The two-slit experiment works as follows.  Photons of light are 
emitted from a source into a box which contains only two exit slits.  
Departure through them will leave the photons in a second box, with a 
collecting apparatus on the far wall to determine where they strike.  After 
the experiment, the collector displays an interference pattern, a series of 
overlapping lights and darks that show where the two light waves 
affected one another.124 
As before, the result is not surprising at first.  We are familiar in our 
daily life with the notion of wave interference.  Anyone who has ever 
                                                          
 122. Id. 
 123. JOHN GRIBBIN, IN SEARCH OF SCHRÖDINGER’S CAT: QUANTUM PHYSICS AND REALITY 164 
(1984). 
 124. WICK, supra note 117, at 40. 
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dropped two things into a pool of water has seen that the ripples created a 
pattern where the crests and troughs either coincide and magnify each 
other or cancel each other out because of their opposition.  We know that 
light travels in waves and expect that it would show the same sort of 
wave interference pattern that water would.125 
The difficulty comes when one hole is covered.  Suddenly the light 
does not behave like a wave.  Now it acts as if it were a particle, as if, to 
use Professor Feynman’s example, it were a machine gun firing bullets 
through the slit.126  There is no wave pattern formed on the collector wall 
when there is only one slit; instead, the light concentrates in one place.  
Professor Feynman’s metaphor holds true; we certainly expect that 
bullets would behave the same way.  However, the wave interference 
pattern reappears when the second slit is reopened.127 
Things get very odd when the emitter is slowed down to release only 
one photon at a time.  If one slit is open, each photon will act as a bullet 
as it travels; it will concentrate on the area of the detector opposite the 
slit.  If both are open, however, each photon will act as if it were part of a 
wave, even if it is released by itself.  Electron by electron, the 
interference pattern that can only be caused by waves will gradually 
appear on the collector.128  This, of course, makes no sense.  It seems 
logical that any particular electron, even if both slits are open, must go 
through only one of them.  When it does that, it should behave as a 
particle, whether or not the other slit is open.129 
Things grow worse.  Physicists discovered a way to force the 
photons to replicate the bullet pattern rather than the wave pattern on the 
collector, even though both slits are open.  The technique requires 
placing detecting mechanisms on the slits.130  Once we know through 
which slit an electron passes, it will behave as a particle that has passed 
through that slit.  Turn off the detector, so we do not know, and the 
interference pattern returns. 
                                                          
 125. GRIBBIN, supra note 123, at 165–66. 
 126. Id. at 168–69. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 170–71. 
 129. Id. at 170. 
 130. Id. at 171.  The same result occurs if one places the entire apparatus in a Wilson cloud 
chamber, which shows the contrails of particular particles.  WICK, supra note 117, at 42. 
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B. “Do You Really Think the Moon is Only There When You Look at 
It?”131 
Albert Einstein famously rejected quantum mechanics, which in his 
view posited a cosmological game of chance.132  He spent a great deal of 
time and energy trying to explain both the two-slit experiment and the 
Stern-Gerlach experiment in a way that made sense classically.  His 
projects failed.  Ultimately Einstein himself could not resolve the 
difficulty of electrons that seemed to change their minds about spin, or 
about photons that seemed to know whether the other slit was open or 
not. 
His question about the moon was in response to the philosophical 
position taken by Neils Bohr and what came to be called “the 
Copenhagen School.”133  Bohr argued that the only way to understand 
quantum paradoxes was to recognize that there was no underlying reality 
of the measured quantity independent of the measurement.134  Bohr 
claimed that as long as one could not know through which slit a 
particular photon traveled, there was only a probability that the photon 
went through one slit or the other.  As probability appears in waves, the 
wave pattern on the collector was perfectly logical.  The moment that an 
observer confirmed that a photon went through a particular slit, either by 
monitoring it or through the simple expedient of closing the other, the 
probabilities for the photon collapsed into a single discrete event.  The 
probability, in other words, does not represent a limit of our knowledge 
about what is really happening; the probability is what is really 
happening.135 
The same is true of the Stern-Gerlach device: as long as the spin of 
the electrons has not been determined by the apparatus, it exists only as a 
probability.  Once the device has measured it, by forcing it into a 
dichotomy of up or down, it is set—at least until a left-right 
measurement commits the electrons to that choice and so reestablishes 
the up-down uncertainty.  The problem, the Copenhagen School asserts, 
is that we tend to think that measurement is a determination of the facts 
of an underlying reality.  There is in fact no underlying reality, 
                                                          
 131. WICK, supra note 117, at xi. 
 132. “The great initial success of quantum theory cannot convert me to believe in that 
fundamental game of dice,” Einstein noted.  Jammer, supra note 116, at 156. 
 133. The Copenhagen School, or Copenhagen Interpretation, derived its name from a certain 
school of thought; its chief interpreter, Neils Bohr, being headquartered in Copenhagen.  See 
THANKAPPAN, supra note 7, at 448. 
 134. Jammer, supra note 116, at 363. 
 135. RICHARD FEYNMAN, THE CHARACTER OF PHYSICAL LAW 145 (1965). 
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Copenhagen adherents argue, only a set of possible outcomes with 
assorted probabilities.  There is certainty only when there is 
measurement and the probabilities collapse to a single measurable 
event.136  Bohr, of course, never argued that the moon disappeared when 
he stopped looking at it.  Indeed, modern defenders of the Copenhagen 
School have explained that this underlying reality at the subatomic level 
does not disrupt our daily lives because the constant interaction of 
particles functions, essentially, as a form of measurement.137  Each 
collision causes the collapse of possibilities, and so a stability exists in 
the world we know which is different from the chaos that we now know 
lurks just out of sight. 
Nevertheless, the primary insight of the Copenhagen School, that 
there is no reality independent of the measurement of reality, is worth 
considering further.  It is precisely the observation that may provide a 
way out of Chuang Tzu’s conundrum, and may offer a valuable new way 
to consider the Establishment Clause. 
IV. COPENHAGEN AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
If the Copenhagen School is correct, it may yield an answer to the 
puzzle Chuang Tzu presented to us.  The Copenhagen approach notes 
that we cannot remove the mechanics of measurement from questions 
about reality.  A particular quantity does not exist in the real world, 
awaiting its quantification by some measuring device.  Instead, the world 
is made up of a series of probable occurrences, which are only reduced to 
certainty by the fact of being measured. 
The same may be true of the Establishment Clause.  In the area of 
government speech, our usual mode of discussion is to treat the 
underlying government action as if it does, or does not, violate the 
Establishment Clause.  If some potential plaintiff believes that it does, 
that person sues the government, asking the court to stop it from 
continuing the kind of speech which violates the Constitution.  The 
government actor responds that the speech in question is constitutionally 
permitted, either because it meets some test or combination of tests, or 
because it falls into some poorly-defined but historically-permitted set of 
permissible exceptions.  The court then decides, generally while 
announcing its intent to remain neutral between religion and nonreligion.  
This might be called the classical model of thinking about the 
                                                          
 136. WICK, supra note 117, at 148–49. 
 137. See, e.g., LINDLEY, supra note 115, at 198 (citing the phenomenon called “decoherence”). 
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Establishment Clause.  As we have seen in the cases and the scholarly 
literature, this model satisfies few. 
A Copenhagen model would be quite different.  A government action 
could not meaningfully be described as complying with or violating the 
Establishment Clause until it was decided, or measured, by a court.  The 
court’s decision could then no more be separated from the deciding than 
an electron’s spin from its Stern-Gerlach device. 
In this model, the court would recognize that it is part of the system, 
not a detached and disinterested observer.  As noted by Justice Black, 
there is no way for the court to avoid taking a position in favor of one 
side or the other.138  Once the court has ruled, the government speech 
will either violate the Establishment Clause or it will not.  The court’s 
decision, then, becomes a part of the underlying question, in ways that 
courts typically decline to recognize.139 
At some level the Copenhagen understanding appears also in the 
reaction of American citizenry to the acts of courts.  Profoundly realist in 
their outlooks, Americans shower the courts, especially the Supreme 
Court, with letters, with protests, and with commentary.  Much of it is 
harsh, vindictive, and unfair.140  All of it, though, reflects the underlying 
assumption that the law is what the Court decides.141  The Court is not, in 
the public eye, announcing an underlying and inevitable reality; the 
Court is announcing its decision.  Indeed, in the context of government 
speech, it seems difficult, if not impossible, to separate the action of the 
Court, a body of government, from the message being sent. 
This Copenhagen model, then, would require courts to acknowledge 
their own role in the process, and admit that their actions cannot be 
neutral between religion and nonreligion.  They will never, despite their 
best intentions, find the neutrality which they seek.  They must decide 
either to allow the particular government action or forbid it.  The result 
must logically favor either religion or nonreligion. 
                                                          
 138. See cases cited supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
 139. Such an idea is already present in our legal system.  In adjudicating criminal liability, after 
all, the plea that is opposite to a “guilty” plea is not “innocent,” but “not guilty.”  We acknowledge 
in so doing that the term “guilty” is not a statement of preexisting fact, but a legal conclusion to be 
determined by a competent authority. 
 140. Some of it is merely perplexing.  I once had the good fortune of seeing a gentleman with a 
sign protesting on the sidewalk of the Supreme Court.  He was upset, it turned out, because his 
automobile had been repossessed, and his letters to the Supreme Court had failed to get it returned. 
 141. Some political leaders share this assumption.  Senator Mitch McConnell’s opposition to 
campaign finance reform has always been based on the argument that the Supreme Court has 
equated money to speech.  See, e.g., Lawrence M. O’Rourke, Campaign Reform Now Law; 
Opponents Swiftly File Two Lawsuits Challenging Rules, CHI. SUN-TIMES, March 28, 2002, at 24. 
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A. Justice Breyer’s Ruminations 
Perhaps the Copenhagen School provides some understanding of 
Justice Breyer’s much maligned opinion in Van Orden.  Because he 
provided the critical fifth vote preserving the Austin monument, some 
scholars have suggested that his “particular brand of pragmatism” was 
“seriously counterproductive,”142 or just plain wrong.143  With a 
Copenhagen interpretation, however, one could view his opinion as 
recognizing the fact that the decision of the Court was inextricably part 
of the government message.  His opinion is therefore not only defensible, 
but truly insightful.  It is true that he refers frequently to the lack of 
consistent standards144 and the necessity for judges to make 
individualized decisions.145  It is also true, though, that he turns time and 
time again to history,146 to the years without agitation concerning the 
Austin monument,147 and to the need to avoid a version of “neutrality” 
that would require the removal of longstanding evidence of religion in 
the public square.148 
One might say that this makes no sense.  A monument is a 
monument, and a new resident in Austin will have no idea whether the 
monument was erected a half-century ago or a month ago.149  There is, 
though, the difference recognized by a Copenhagen interpretation.  A 
decision to leave an old monument, if phrased in terms of history, 
provides no justification to erect new monuments.  No reader could fairly 
conclude from Justice Breyer’s opinion that putting up new granite 
monuments of the Ten Commandments would survive an Establishment 
Clause challenge.150  On the other hand, a decision requiring its removal 
                                                          
 142. William Van Alstyne, Ten Commandments, Nine Judges, and Five Versions of One 
Amendment—The First (“NOW WHAT?”), 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 17, 25 n.24 (2005). 
 143. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Why Justice Breyer Was Wrong in Van Orden v. Perry, 14 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 3 (2005). 
 144. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 699 (2004) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[T]he Court 
has found no single mechanical formula that can accurately draw the constitutional line in every 
case.”). 
 145. See id. at 700 (“I see no test-related substitute for the exercise of legal judgment.”). 
 146. Id. at 701. 
 147. Id. at 702. 
 148. Id. at 699. 
 149. See, e.g., Susan Hanley Kosse, A Missed Opportunity to Abandon the Reasonable Observer 
Framework in Sacred Text Cases: McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky and Van Orden v. Perry, 
4 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 139, 170 (2006) (“[M]ost observers will probably not know the age of the 
display forcing courts to create yet another fiction to find such knowledge.”). 
 150. Indeed, Justice Breyer specifically warned against this interpretation.  See Van Orden, 545 
U.S. at 703 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[A] more contemporary state effort to focus attention upon a 
religious text is certainly likely to prove divisive in a way that this longstanding, pre-existing 
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by bulldozer or backhoe would greatly encourage challenges to other 
such monuments.  Justice Breyer’s decision, had it been concurred in by 
a majority of the Court, would have gone far toward establishing a cease-
fire in the nation’s on-going religious battles.  Because it is a decision of 
one, though, the Copenhagen clarity it offers is not particularly available 
to lower courts. 
B. The Chaos that Exists 
As noted above,151 the Supreme Court’s Ten Commandments cases 
did not offer reconcilable principles of constitutional law.  The resulting 
doctrinal confusion was predictable.  Lower courts applying Van Orden 
and McCreary County have shown little ability to combine ideas that the 
members of the Court themselves were unable to reconcile.  The string of 
cases to date following Van Orden and McCreary County have exhibited 
no consistency the author can discover: the judges select quotes from one 
of the lead opinions in either the Texas or Kentucky case, paying little 
more attention to the other of the pair than those lead opinions 
themselves did.  People have challenged a wide range of government 
religious expression in the lower courts, and the responses have been as 
chaotic as one might have expected. 
1. Other Fraternal Order of Eagles Monuments 
The first fertile field of decisions arose concerning monuments 
identical to the one in Texas.  As Justice Stevens noted in his dissent in 
Van Orden, the Austin monument was not unique; it was part of a very 
large family. 152  The monuments sponsored by the Fraternal Order of 
Eagles came under fire in locales as diverse as Washington153 and 
Indiana.154  Indeed, many of these challenges had arisen before or during 
the Van Orden litigation,155 and the lower courts had prudently awaited 
                                                                                                                       
monument has not.”). 
 151. See supra Part II.D. 
 152. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 713 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (referring to hundreds of replicas of 
the monument provided by the combined effort of the Fraternal Order of Eagles and Cecil B. 
DeMille, director of The Ten Commandments). 
 153. Card v. City of Everett, 386 F. Supp. 2d 1171 (W.D. Wash. 2005). 
 154. Russelburg v. Gibson County, No. 3:03-CV-149-RLY-WGH, 2005 WL 2175527 (S.D. Ind. 
Sept. 7, 2005). 
 155. See, e.g., ACLU Neb. Found. v. City of Plattsmouth, 419 F.3d 772, 774–75 (8th Cir. 2005) 
(“We granted [the] petition for rehearing en banc to review the District Court’s determination that 
the City’s display of the monument violates the Establishment Clause.  With the benefit of the 
United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Van Orden v. Perry, we now reverse.” (citations 
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the Supreme Court’s decision.  Unsurprisingly, considering the outcome 
in Van Orden, all survived their challenges.  In many cases, the courts’ 
application of Van Orden and McCreary County was perfunctory; even 
in cases where courts had initially understood Lemon to require the 
removal of the monuments, they summarily reversed lower courts or 
themselves, recognizing that the similarities with the Austin monument 
were “virtually identical,”156 or at least “too vivid to dismiss.”157  Even 
where significant differences might exist, as in the case of the Fargo 
monument that stood alone near the city building, federal courts found 
that the similarities among the Fraternal Order of Eagles monuments 
outweighed their differences.158 
In one particularly thoughtful analysis of the Supreme Court 
precedents, a federal judge outlined his understanding of them and 
elegantly related them to the case before him.  In dispensing with a 
challenge to a monument identical to Austin’s in the city of Everett, 
Washington,159 Judge Lasnik admitted that the opinions in the Court’s 
two Ten Commandments cases might have “mystified” the “average 
American.”160  He was not at all puzzled, however: he focused on the 
context of the displays, “particularly [on] the length of time . . . without 
protest.”161  In allowing the monument to remain, he quoted Justice 
Breyer’s Van Orden observation that a decision to remove a long-
standing monument might only increase strife.162 
In a footnote, though, he recognized the other side of the equation: 
“an attempt to display the Ten Commandments on public property in 
today’s multi-religious America would likely engender an immediate 
challenge . . . . Such displays would be immediately divisive . . . .”163 
2. Other “Foundations of American Law and Government” Displays 
The other obvious place to find the result of the mixed message of 
Van Orden and McCreary County is in courthouses, as other Kentucky 
                                                                                                                       
omitted)). 
 156. Id. at 775.  The dissent argued that the Plattsmouth monument differed from that in Austin 
because the former was alone, not part of a larger display.  Id. at 780 (Bye, J., dissenting). 
 157. Russelburg, 2005 WL 2175527, at *2. 
 158. Twombly v. City of Fargo, 388 F. Supp. 2d 983, 992 (D.N.D. 2005) (noting that the grassy 
mall in which the monument was located created sufficient secular messages in itself by being used 
for, inter alia, the Fargo Blues Festival). 
 159. Card v. City of Everett, 386 F. Supp. 2d 1171, 1173 (W.D. Wash. 2005). 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 1177. 
 163. Id. at 1177 n.7 (citations omitted). 
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counties as well as other communities began to erect their own displays 
celebrating the “Foundations of American Law and Government” 
(FALG).  Because their predecessor failed to survive an Establishment 
Clause challenge, one might think that McCreary County doomed them 
just as surely as Van Orden saved the other FOE monuments.  This has 
not been the case. 
The majority in McCreary County focused on the purpose prong of 
the Lemon test,164 and found the improper effect of the displays in part 
from the history of the two overtly religious displays that preceded 
FALG displays.165  By doing so, the majority left room for even 
McCreary and Pulaski counties themselves to reestablish the displays, 
once they had sufficiently purged themselves of an improper, endorsing 
purpose.166  Of course, they almost immediately requested a removal of 
the injunction so that they might reinstall the FALG displays.167  While 
the litigation in those counties continues,168 other counties in Kentucky 
have subsequently had their displays—identical to the third display in 
McCreary County—blessed by federal courts because they “lack[] a 
similar sectarian pedigree.”169  A cynical observer might think that local 
leadership had learned, from the McCreary and Pulaski experience, 
exactly what behavior the courts would be willing to tolerate, and walked 
boldly to the boundary.  A more charitable interpretation sees the local 
officials as distinctly interested in the public education value of posting 
these displays.  Indeed, a series of state legislatures have enacted or 
considered legislation specifically authorizing the displays.170  The courts 
have so far generally adopted the charitable, more permissive 
interpretation of county behavior.171 
                                                          
 164. McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 861 (2005) (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 
403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971)). 
 165. Id. at 866. 
 166. Id. at 873–74. 
 167. Peter Smith, Ten Commandments Cases Have Varied Results, COURIER-J., Oct. 3, 2007, at 
1B. 
 168. See Bill Estep, ACLU Asks $400,000 in Fees in Ten Commandments Case, LEXINGTON 
HERALD-LEADER, Sept. 6, 2008, at D1 (stating that the “case is still pending”). 
 169. See, e.g., ACLU of Ky. v. Mercer County, 432 F.3d 624, 631 (6th Cir. 2005) (“Here, there 
was only one display, one authorizing measure, and one implementation, all of which demonstrate a 
secular purpose.”). 
 170. By way of example, the state legislatures of South Carolina and Georgia have considered 
such legislation.  See Yvonne M. Wenger & Adam Parker, S.C. Might Allow Religious Displays in 
Public Spaces, THE POST AND COURIER, Mar. 23, 2007, at A1, and GA. CODE ANN. § 45-13-51 
(West Supp. 2007). 
 171. See, e.g., Mercer County, 432 F.3d at 627 (finding nothing in the legislative history 
indicating a religious purpose). 
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3. The Rock in the Desert 
The pro-religious speech side of the war has not won all of its 
battles.  In one particularly labyrinthine case, federal courts as well as 
Congress have spent a great deal of energy trying to settle the fate of a 
cross made of metal pipe on a hilltop called Sunrise Rock in the Mojave 
Desert.172  A predecessor of the cross appeared, without the permission 
of any government agency, on federal land at least by 1934.173  Some 
members of the Veterans of Foreign Wars had set up a wooden cross 
with a small commemorative sign in memory of fallen comrades, and 
religious groups subsequently used the site for Easter sunrise services.174  
The cross came to the notice of the government in 1999, when a 
Buddhist asked if he could add a stupa175 next to the cross.176  By then 
the original wooden cross was just a memory, replaced most recently in 
1998 by an enterprising individual who drilled holes into the rock to 
allow the fitting of the five-foot tall white-painted metal pipe cross.177 
The National Park Service rejected the stupa request and, after 
determining that there was neither authorization for the cross nor 
historical significance to it, determined to remove it.178  Congress then 
entered the fray, prohibiting the use of government funds to pay for 
removal,179 and later designating it a national memorial.180  While the 
challenges to the cross were still pending, Congress took the 
precautionary further step of authorizing the trade of the single acre 
containing the cross to a private owner in return for a five-acre parcel of 
land elsewhere.181  The owner, perhaps unsurprisingly, was the very 
same gentleman who had drilled the holes into the rock for mounting the 
current cross.182 
The Ninth Circuit disallowed the land transfer, relying in large 
measure on a case from Oregon disapproving of a similar attempt to 
                                                          
 172. Buono v. Kempthorne, 502 F.3d 1069, 1071–79 (9th Cir. 2007), amended and superseded 
on denial of reh’g, 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 173. Id. at 1072. 
 174. See id. (stating that the worship services became regular in 1984). 
 175. A stupa is a mound used for worship purposes; Buddhism integrated the practice before the 
advent of the Indian emperor Ashoka.  SOURCES OF INDIAN TRADITION 94 (Wm. Theodore de Bary 
ed., 1958). 
 176. Buono, 502 F.3d at 1072. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 1073. 
 179. Id. (citing Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 133, 114 Stat. 2763A-230 (2000)). 
 180. Id. (citing Pub. L. No. 107-117, § 8137, 115 Stat. 2278-79 (2002)). 
 181. Id. at 1074 (citing Pub. L. No. 108-87, § 8121, 117 Stat. 1100 (2003)). 
 182. Id. at 1072, 1075 (identifying Mr. Henry Sandoz of Mountain Pass, California). 
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convert public into private speech by making a park into private 
property.183  Perhaps surprisingly, the only reference to the seemingly 
relevant Ten Commandments cases of 2005 was the observation—in a 
footnote—that together they demonstrate “the need to conduct a fact-
specific inquiry in this area.”184 
4. The City of the Crosses 
The Court’s conflicting observations about the Establishment Clause 
were apparently little more helpful in resolving the constitutionality of 
the appearance of three crosses on school maintenance vehicles and a 
student-painted mural at the Booker T. Washington Elementary School 
in Las Cruces, New Mexico.185  Judge Brack was able to cite them for the 
propositions that the term “establishment” is not “self-defining,”186 and 
that Establishment Clause challenges are thus “heavily dependent on the 
specific context and content of the display.”187 
He then proceeded to turn to the “traditional standard”—the Lemon 
test;188 combining it with the endorsement test,189 he found no violation 
in the actions of the school district.190  He found the crosses on the 
maintenance vehicles, and those in the mural, reflected the city’s name 
rather than any improper religious purpose.191  Unspoken in the opinion 





                                                          
 183. Id. at 1075 (citing Separation of Church and State Comm. v. City of Eugene, 93 F.3d 617, 
618–20 (9th Cir. 1996)).  In some ways the Sunrise Rock case was easier for the Ninth Circuit than 
the cross in Eugene had been: the cross in the Mojave sat amid a “vast” preserve, ninety percent of 
which the federal government owned, Buono, 502 F.3d at 1086 (citing Buono v. Norton, 371 F.3d 
543, 550 (9th Cir. 2004)), and the government retained rights of management and control of the land 
even after the transfer.  Id. at 1083. 
 184. Buono, 502 F.3d at 1082 n.13. 
 185. Weinbaum v. Las Cruces Pub. Sch., 465 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1185 (D.N.M. 2006), aff’d, 541 
F.3d 1017 (10th Cir. 2008). 
 186. Id. at 1191 (quoting McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 874–75 (2005)). 
 187. Id. (quoting O’Connor v. Washburn, 416 F.3d 1216, 1222 (10th Cir. 2005)). 
 188. Id.  The Court noted that the Van Orden plurality had not used Lemon, but the case had also 
not overruled it.  Id. at 1192. 
 189. Id. at 1191 (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687–94 (1984) and County of 
Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 595 (1989)). 
 190. Id. at 1193. 
 191. Id. at 1194. 
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official seal if its name is not based on religion,192 why may a city have a 
religious name?193 
5. The Bible Monument194 
The federal court did not seem terribly interested in the story of 
William Mosher.  A citizen of Houston, he was clearly a hero to some; 
upon his death, the Star of Hope Mission, a religious charity that 
benefited the poor, set up a monument in his honor.195  The monument, 
which sat on the grounds of the Harris County Civil Courthouse, was not 
a statue, but rather a large pedestal with a glass top that originally 
contained a Bible.196  The passage it originally displayed, if it sat open at 
all, went unmentioned in the court’s opinion.  It is clear, however, that 
the sight of a book under glass proved very tempting to some members 
of the Houston community.  Someone smashed the glass and took the 
original Bible.197  Later replacements, installed at their own expense by 
Star of Hope Mission, met a similar fate.198  Presumably exasperated, the 
mission gave up and stopped replacing the Bibles in 1988.199 
Things were quiet for almost a decade until the election campaign of 
John Devine for district judge, a campaign which overtly sought to 
introduce Christianity into government.200  After his election, he 
organized a fundraiser to repair the Mosher monument, installing a Bible 
and a red neon light to illuminate the Bible during hours of darkness.201  
                                                          
 192. See id.  The Court discussed a number of recent precedents in which courts enjoined cities 
from including crosses on their city seals, including Robinson v. City of Edmond, 68 F.3d 1226 (10th 
Cir. 1995), Webb v. City of Republic, 55 F. Supp. 2d 994 (W.D. Mo. 1999), and ACLU of Ohio v. 
City of Stow, 29 F. Supp. 2d 845 (N.D. Ohio 1998).  Weinbaum, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 1194.  
Interestingly, the Court includes in its list the case of Harris v. City of Zion, 927 F.2d 1401 (7th Cir. 
1991), but it makes no effort to explain how that city in Illinois, founded by a minister as an overtly 
religious place and governed by “the Theocratic Party . . . for more than two generations,” id. at 
1424 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting), differed constitutionally from Las Cruces.  Weinbaum, 465 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1194. 
 193. Indeed, I confess that I have always been struck by the unstated irony of Lee v. Weisman, 
505 U.S. 577 (1992).  The Court struck down the eighth-grade graduation prayer with only one, 
utterly non-ironic, mention of the fact that the case arose in a city named Providence.  See id. at 580. 
 194. Staley v. Harris County, 461 F.3d 504, 507 n.3 (5th Cir. 2006) (noting that news reports 
referred to it as the Bible monument, rather than as the Mosher monument). 
 195. Id. at 506. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Or, perhaps, removed the Bible.  There is some evidence that about this time there were 
serious complaints from atheists about the monument.  Id. 
 200. Id. at 507. 
 201. Id. 
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A number of Christian ministers attended the reinstallation ceremony and 
led prayers; they also sang “The Battle Hymn of the Republic.”202 
An atheist lawyer whose practice necessitated frequent trips to the 
courthouse challenged the monument in federal court.203  The district 
court found a violation of the Establishment Clause, and the Fifth Circuit 
agreed.204  The appellate court’s approach to this admittedly 
extraordinary set of facts illustrates the current difficulties with doctrine 
in this area.  The majority relied almost exclusively on the two 2005 
cases, although they used McCreary County to import the purpose prong 
of the still-vibrant Lemon test.205  More significantly, the court drew from 
that case the relevance of history, noting that “the entire history” is 
relevant to the judicial inquiry.206  When turning to Van Orden, the court 
went directly to Justice Breyer’s concurrence, noting that it was the 
controlling opinion for precedential purposes.207  The court referred 
repeatedly to Justice Breyer’s focus on history and context.208 
Applying these history-oriented guidelines to the Mosher monument, 
the court noted that the original monument might well have survived a 
contemporary challenge.209  Nevertheless, subsequent events, including 
the refurbishment and rededication in 1995, meant that the monument 
had “evolved into a predominantly religious symbol.”210  Thus, for the 
court, the purpose inquiry itself could take into account change over 
time, a position that provoked a fierce dissent.211 
The court’s approach may not demonstrate the “appalling hostility to 
any hint of religion in public spaces” of which the dissent accused it,212 
but it does lead to some rather odd results.  As the dissent noted, at some 
time in the future, the Star of Hope Mission could reinstall the Bible in 
the monument, in an appropriately secular ceremony, and this would 
satisfy the Establishment Clause.213  Indeed, as a matter of logic, the 
                                                          
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. at 508. 
 205. Id. at 509. 
 206. Id. at 513. 
 207. Id. at 511 n.8 (citing Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977)). 
 208. Id. at 512. 
 209. See id. at 513 (“[T]he fact that the monument, with the Bible, stood without complaint for 
thirty-two years, supports the notion that the original purpose was not objectively seen as 
predominantly religious.”). 
 210. Id. at 514–15. 
 211. Id. at 515 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. at 522.  Apparently, at oral argument the plaintiff conceded that an identical monument 
with a Bible would be permissible if dedicated to a minister such as the Reverend Martin Luther 
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Fifth Circuit approach might well forbid a secular monument if 
government officials began incorporating it into worship or other 
religious activities. 
The Copenhagen approach, on the other hand, would avoid the 
problem of transferred intent altogether.  It would not matter whether the 
court could find a primarily secular purpose at installation, or even 
repair.  Instead, the court would focus on the effect on the community of 
the removal of the Bible and its red neon light.  Although a close case, 
the kind that probably would require significant fact-finding by the trial 
court, it is possible that such an approach would have allowed the Bible 
to stay, but required the lighting to go.214 
6. The Divine Comedy 
From the perspective of the Copenhagen test, there has been no more 
unfortunate recent case than that which arose in the “somewhat 
bucolic”215 setting of Stigler, Oklahoma.  In that small town in 2004, a 
local citizen and part-time minister received divine guidance that Stigler 
needed a Ten Commandments monument on its courthouse lawn.216  He 
raised the money for it himself, obtained the monument,217 and led the 
dedication ceremony that the court called “mostly religious in nature.”218  
In less than a year, opponents filed a lawsuit, arguing rather 
conventionally that the monument lacked a secular purpose and endorsed 
a particular religious group.219  During the course of the lawsuit, a rally 
took place that was designed to support the monument.220  In attendance 
were two of the County Commissioners, one United States Senator, and 
several local preachers, whose speeches, in the court’s words, “were both 
                                                                                                                       
King, Jr.  Id. 
 214. Truth is always stranger than fiction; and in the fact-heavy world of current Establishment 
Clause law, the story of the Mosher monument became even stranger outside of the federal courts.  
Before the Fifth Circuit could hear the case en banc, the county made it moot by removing the entire 
monument to storage due to an ongoing stairway renovation project at the courthouse.  Staley v. 
Harris County, 485 F.3d 305, 307 (5th Cir. 2007).  The Circuit dismissed the appeal, see id. at 309 
(citing that the appeal was moot), but did not vacate the District Court’s injunction requiring removal 
of the Bible.  Id. at 314.  The monument remains in storage to date, although the county attorney has 
said they may install it elsewhere on county property.  John MacCormack, Bible Saga Won’t See 
High Court Docket, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS NEWS, Nov. 27, 2007, at B1. 
 215. Green v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 450 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1274 (E.D. Okla. 2006). 
 216. While eating lunch, “he felt as if ‘the Lord laid a burden on [his] heart.’”  Id. at 1276. 
 217. The monument contains an abbreviated version of the Ten Commandments on one side, 
including the misspelled word “adultry”; on the other it contains a portion of the Mayflower 
Compact.  Id. at 1276–78. 
 218. Id. at 1276. 
 219. Id. at 1279. 
 220. Id. at 1280. 
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political and religious in nature.”221  A Copenhagen approach would 
likely find this to be an easily resolved case.  Although those who 
installed it and rallied on its behalf would no doubt take removal of the 
monument poorly, a decision to allow it to remain would only serve 
notice that contemporary placement of such overtly religious monuments 
before courthouses was perfectly legitimate.  The creation of more such 
monuments, with the inevitably accompanying social discord, would 
ensue.222 
Unfortunately, the District Court hearing the case did not adopt a 
Copenhagen approach and take account of the impact of its own opinion 
on religious strife.  Indeed, it is difficult to isolate the analytical model 
that the court used to resolve the case.  The judge dismissed the 2005 
cases as unhelpful,223 focused on the outdoor location and private 
funding as the circumstances most relevant to making the case at issue 
like Van Orden rather than McCreary County,224 and castigated Justice 
Breyer for his focus on the role of history.225  He even hinted that those 
opposing the monument showed religious intolerance.226  By ignoring the 
contemporary events, the court ignored the obvious concerns of both the 
McCreary County majority and Justice Breyer’s Van Orden concurrence.  
He referred on several occasions to the small, intimate nature of the 
town,227 but audaciously claimed that when a County Commissioner 
“spoke a few defiant words”228 at the rally,229 a reasonable observer 
would not conclude that “he attended in his official capacity.”230  The 
                                                          
 221. Id. 
 222. Indeed, it is not clear which begat which, but there seems to be a second recently installed 
monument that contains the same jarring spelling error “adultry.”  See Sherri Day, Monument Fight 
Lacks a Fighter, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Jan. 2, 2007, available at http://www.sptimes.com/2007 
/01/02/State/Monument_fight_lacks_.shtml; see also The Society for the Promotion of Good 
Grammar, The Devil’s in the Details, Dec. 3, 2006, http://grammatically.blogspot.com/2006_12 
_01_archive.html (close-up of monument). 
 223. In referring to McCreary County and Van Orden, the opinion notes that “[o]ne might think 
that two such recent precedents addressing the same subject would drastically simplify a trial court’s 
quest in deciding whether the Monument at issue here withstands constitutional scrutiny.  One might 
be wrong.”  Green, 450 F. Supp. 2d at 1284. 
 224. Id. at 1291. 
 225. The important factor for the court is “the objective effects of an edifice,” which would exist 
long after any accompanying governmental pronouncements “are past and forgotten.”  Id. at 1289. 
 226. “Also, exactly why would a newer display be more divisive than an older one?  Is it, as 
Justice Breyer suggests, because of our supposedly increased religious diversity?  Or, is it because 
our nation is actually less religiously tolerant than earlier in our history?”  Id. at 1288. 
 227. See id. at 1276, 1280 (“[E]veryone knows each other.”). 
 228. Id. at 1290. 
 229. He threatened to stand in front of the monument and make any bulldozer roll over him 
before it could reach the Ten Commandments Monument.  Id. at 1280. 
 230. Id. at 1290. 
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opinion is filled with facts that depict a McCreary County-like infusion 
of religion into politics.  The court ignored the implications of them all. 
What makes the case tragic is that it is brilliantly written.  Judge 
White’s alliteration, plays on words, and tongue-in-cheek style have been 
justly recognized for their excellence.231  It is the very quality of the 
writing, though—to say nothing of its structural references to Dante’s 
Divine Comedy—that makes so jarring the judge’s overt hostility to the 
effort to remove this very recent, very religious, and very divisive 
monument.232 
C. The Neglected Value: Religious Peace 
Ultimately, an offer of a new paradigm for Establishment Clause 
cases must bring some advantage over the current chaos.  As the cases 
just discussed demonstrate, a Copenhagen view does not create a bright 
line or black letter rule that will prove easy to apply in a mechanical way.  
A court taking account of its own role, though, might bring to the 
decision-making process an undervalued concern in current 
jurisprudence: the maintenance of what we might call “religious 
peace.”233  The Framers of the Constitution were well aware of the 







                                                          
 231. The opinion was one of six chosen for inclusion in Exemplary Legal Writers 2006, 10 
GREEN BAG 152 (2007). 
 232. Green, 450 F. Supp. 2d at 1281–82 (noting that one of the Commissioners disliked one of 
the plaintiffs because he was “a courthouse gadfly,” criticizing a member of the other for her “self-
righteous indignation,” while finding that the Commissioners’ “down-to-earth demeanor betrayed no 
dissembling, artifice or deception”).  The court later announced that it would not allow the plaintiffs 
to file a federal claim, “bask smugly in the resulting frenzy,” and then use the frenzy to show an 
Establishment Clause violation.  Id. at 1290–91. 
 233. The phrase may have arisen from the 1555 Act of the Diet of Augsburg of the Holy Roman 
Empire that endeavored to create a “permanent and perpetual peace . . . in regard to religious 
disputes.”  Herman Tüchle, The Peace of Augsburg: New Order or Lull in the Fighting, in 
GOVERNMENT IN REFORMATION EUROPE, 1520–1560, at 145 (Henry J. Cohn ed., 1971).  In an early 
example of increasing religious pluralism over time, only Roman Catholicism and Lutheranism were 
permitted within the Holy Roman Empire from that date until 1648, when the Peace of Westphalia 
following the Thirty Years’ War added Calvinism as a third legal religion.  See 2 ANTON GINDELY, 
HISTORY OF THE THIRTY YEARS’ WAR 372 (Andrew Ten Brook trans., Books for Libraries Press 
1972) (1885). 
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fragile new nation.234  Indeed, the history they relied on included 
powerful examples of religions shattering nations.235 
Current doctrinal confusion does little or nothing to further religious 
peace.  Indeed, some of the Justices whom one might expect to support 
such a goal have spoken against it directly.236  It might be thought to 
smack a bit too much of instrumentalism, which may rival “activism” for 
pride of place in the list of judicial deadly sins.  Justice Breyer’s 
concurring opinion in Van Orden provoked precisely the charge that he 
was concerned with the effects of the Court’s decision, a concern that 
struck at least some of his colleagues as fundamentally wrong.237  The 
judiciary, say critics of decision-making that considers outcomes, should 
be above such petty concerns.  The proper judge should be a neutral 
participant, an umpire, seeking a neutral solution in these Establishment 
Clause cases. 
If, though, the observation of Chuang Tzu is correct, there can be no 
neutrality when deciding government religious activity; the display may 
stay, or it must go.  In any event, it is difficult to see what could be worse 
with a Copenhagen approach.  The experience of the later FALG cases 
shows that a purpose inquiry leads to a tactical deployment of the Lemon 
test to insert divisive new religious materials into government activity.  
Indeed, opinions like that of District Judge White238 would seem, by 
ignoring or belittling the religious strife in the community, to aggravate 
rather than ameliorate the difficulties. 
                                                          
 234. In his list of the “latent causes of faction,” Madison began with “a zeal for different 
opinions concerning religion,” although he did note that “the most common and durable source” was 
the “unequal distribution of property.”  THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 131 (James Madison) (Benjamin 
Fletcher Wright, ed. 1961).  That Madison was concerned about religion at all speaks volumes when 
taken in the context of the earlier essay by John Jay which maintained: “Providence has been pleased 
to give this one connected country to one united people . . . professing the same religion.”  Id. No. 2, 
at 38 (John Jay). 
 235. See, e.g., the discussion of Switzerland in THE FEDERALIST NO. 19 (James Madison), id. at 
180–81 (arguing that the cantons of Switzerland did not really constitute a confederacy, and that the 
Protestant-Catholic divide had essentially ended their common enterprise).  This recognition of 
Swiss division was prescient; sixty years later the Swiss Confederation would divide along the lines 
noted by Madison and fight a brief civil war.  See CHARLES GILLIARD, A HISTORY OF SWITZERLAND 
88–91 (D.L.B. Hartly trans., 1955); E. BONJOUR ET AL., A SHORT HISTORY OF SWITZERLAND 261–
65 (1952). 
 236. In explaining the endorsement test, Justice O’Connor rejected the crèche’s opponent’s 
reliance upon political divisiveness, refusing to elevate it to “an independent test of 
constitutionality.”  Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 689 (1984). 
 237. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 692 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 238. See supra Part IV.B.6 (analyzing the opinion of Green v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 450 F. 
Supp. 2d 1273 (E.D. Okla. 2006)). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, then, this is a plea for a prudentialism that accounts for 
both the current state of the region and the historical background of the 
government speech at issue.  These two views, called (albeit in a 
decidedly different context) the historical and temporal dimensions by 
Professors Levinson and Balkin,239 allow the court to recognize the 
broader context of the society in which it is intervening before it acts.  To 
put this idea back into the terms of physics, the court recognizes that it 
inevitably will affect the path and spin of the electron, so it should at 
least be aware of as much of its surroundings as possible before doing so. 
Use of a Copenhagen model, an admittedly self-referential model of 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence, would certainly not solve all 
problems easily.  Nor would it immediately end the current political 
hostility over the role of religion in society.  It would offer, however, a 
cease-fire.  Members of faiths which are majorities in particular areas 
would be unable to use the government to trumpet their own beliefs, as 
they would almost certainly face an immediate response from those who 
dissent.  Even where that was not so, courts might legitimately prevent 
new government religious speech on the ground that it would encourage 
other, more divisive acts.  On the other hand, those who seek to remove 
the vestiges of pre-existing religious speech throughout the nation’s 
towns and cities would quickly discover that courts would have very 
little willingness to order the removal of old monuments unless the 
society had turned against them so completely that a court case would 
not be necessary. 
Ultimate political solutions to seemingly intractable problems can 
seldom be offered by the judiciary.  Perhaps it is a pipe dream to hope 
that during such a period of enforced peace, true tolerance could be 
discovered between the forces of nonreligion and those of religion.  
Perhaps it is too much to hope that such an approach by the courts would 
create a “permanent and perpetual peace”240 among warring faiths.  
Having the judiciary recognize its role and endeavor to withdraw from 
the battle, though, might help such a truce to become, over time, 
habitual. 
 
                                                          
 239. Sanford Levinson & Jack M. Balkin, What are the Facts of Marbury v. Madison? 20 
CONST. COMMENT. 255, 273 (2003). 
 240. See Tüchle, supra note 233, at 145. 
